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Enhancing Physical Layer Security of Random
Caching in Large-Scale Multi-Antenna
Heterogeneous Wireless Networks
Wanli Wen, Chenxi Liu, Yaru Fu, Tony Q. S. Quek, Fu-Chun Zheng, and Shi Jin
Abstract—In this paper, we propose a novel secure random
caching scheme for large-scale multi-antenna heterogeneous wire-
less networks, where the base stations (BSs) deliver randomly
cached confidential contents to the legitimate users in the
presence of passive eavesdroppers as well as active jammers.
In order to safeguard the content delivery, we consider that the
BSs transmits the artificial noise together with the useful signals.
By using tools from stochastic geometry, we first analyze the
average reliable transmission probability (RTP) and the average
confidential transmission probability (CTP), which take both the
impact of the eavesdroppers and the impact of the jammers into
consideration. We further provide tight upper and lower bounds
on the average RTP. These analytical results enable us to obtain
rich insights into the behaviors of the average RTP and the
average CTP with respect to key system parameters. Moreover,
we optimize the caching distribution of the files to maximize the
average RTP of the system, while satisfying the constraints on the
caching size and the average CTP. Through numerical results,
we show that our proposed secure random caching scheme can
effectively boost the secrecy performance of the system compared
to the existing solutions.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, random caching, multi-
antenna, heterogeneous wireless networks, stochastic geometry,
optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of wireless technology, the
global mobile data traffic is expected to reach 77 exabytes
per month by 2022, which is a sevenfold increase over 2017
[1]. However, the majority of such traffic is asynchronously but
repeatedly requested by many users at different times and thus
a tremendous amount of mobile data traffic has actually been
redundantly generated over the mobile networks [2]. Against
this backdrop, caching popular contents at the base stations
(BSs) has been proposed as a promising approach for shifting
the huge mobile data traffic from remote clouds to the edges
in mobile networks [3], [4], thereby significantly improving
the users’ quality of service (QoS). Motivated by this, cache-
enabled wireless networks has recently been attracting great
research attention.
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However, due to the equipment size and cost issues, the
storage resources at BSs are usually limited. Therefore, which
contents should be cached at BSs becomes a vital design
problem, refereed to as the caching scheme design problem,
in cache-enabled wireless networks. In [5]–[15], the authors
proposed various caching schemes to improve the content
transmission reliability (i.e., the probability that the requested
content can be successfully transmitted from the BSs to
the users, which can reflect the users’ QoS) in large-scale
cache-enabled wireless networks. Specifically, in [5], the most
popular caching scheme was studied, in which each BS only
stores the most popular files. However, such a caching scheme
may not yield the optimal network performance, since it
cannot provide any content diversity [11]–[13]. To tackle this
issue, random caching scheme was considered in [6]–[15].
More specifically, in [6], the uniform caching was studied,
in which, each BS randomly stores a file according to the
uniform distribution. In [7]–[15], the optimal random caching
was examined to maximize the cache hit probability [7], [8],
the successful offloading probability [9], and the successful
transmission probability [10]–[14], or minimize the average
caching failure probability [15].
Although significant efforts have been devoted to improve
the reliability of content transmission [5]–[15], the content
transmission secrecy is another important design aspect in the
cache-enabled wireless networks, yet receives much less atten-
tion. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications,
the transmissions of the contents cached at BSs are vulnerable
to potential eavesdroppers (e.g., non-paying subscribers) and
jammers [16]–[18]. By attempting to intercept the users’
content transmissions, the eavesdroppers can degrade the con-
fidentiality of content transmissions. By transmitting harmful
interfering signal in the wireless networks, the jammers can
reduce the reliability of content transmissions. Currently, the
most of mobile data services still rely on the traditional
cryptographic encryption to guarantee the confidentiality of
content transmission. Nevertheless, such encryption creates an
insurmountable obstacle to caching content at BSs, since the
encrypted content are uniquely defined for each user’s request
and cannot be reused to serve other users’ requests [19].
Against this background, physical layer security has been re-
garded as a promising solution to support caching and enhance
the confidentiality of content transmission simultaneously in
large-scale cache-enabled single-tier [20], [21] or multi-tier
heterogeneous wireless networks (HetNets) [22], due to the
fact that it only relies on wiretap channel coding instead of
2source encryption. In particular, the authors in [20] and [22]
proposed a partition-based hybrid caching scheme, where the
cache of each BS was partitioned into two halves for storing
both the most popular contents and fractions of other contents,
and analyzed different physical-layer security performance
such as the transmission capacity and energy efficiency [20] as
well as the secure content delivery probability [22]. In [21],
the authors leveraged the content diversity provided by the
random caching to optimize the cache hit probability subject
to different content confidentiality level constraints.
The authors in [20]–[22] only considered deploying single-
antenna at each BS, and therefore, their proposed caching
schemes may not achieve desirable security performance in
multi-antenna wireless networks. In addition, unlike [20], [22],
to deliberately confuse the eavesdroppers, an artificial-noise-
aided transmission strategy was further considered in [21].
The key idea of this strategy is to use part of the transmit
power at the BS to inject artificial noise into the null space
of the legitimate user’s channel, thereby significantly reducing
the link quality of the eavesdropper without interfering with
the legitimate user [23]. However, since the BSs only have
single-antenna, in [21], each BS is only able to transmit either
artificial noise or content, resulting in that some users will
not be able to download their requested content in a timely
manner. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that the authors
in [20]–[22] only focused on combating the eavesdropping
attack in cache-enabled wireless networks, leading to that
their proposed caching schemes may not efficiently resist
jamming attack.
In this paper, we would like to address the above issues. We
consider a large-scale multi-antenna HetNet employing ran-
dom caching and artificial-noise-aided transmission strategy,
where the BSs deployed at multiple tiers transmit the randomly
cached confidential content together with the artificial noise
to the legitimate users in the presence of the jammers as
well as eavesdroppers. We define and evaluate the content
average reliable transmission probability (RTP) and the content
average confidential transmission probability (CTP), which
characterizes the reliability and the confidentiality of content
transmissions, respectively. Our key goal is to determine a
secure random caching scheme that maximizes the average
RTP under the average CTP and storage resource constraints.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We derive closed-form expressions for the average RTP
and CTP in the considered HetNets. Based on which, we
further derive tight upper and lower bounds on the aver-
age RTP. These analytical results allow us to reveal how
the jamming and eavesdropping can have a significant
impact on large-scale cache-enabled HetNets.
• We propose a new secure random caching scheme in
which the caching distribution of the contents is judi-
ciously determined to maximize the average RTP, while
satisfying the constraints on the average CTP and the
storage resource.
• Through numerical results, we show that the proposed
secure caching scheme outperforms the existing baselines
and significantly improves the average RTP, while being
resist to the jamming and eavesdropping attack.
Beyond the above contributions, this paper provides valuable
insights into the design of secure large-scale cache-enable
HetNets. Specifically, we show that, when the constraint on
the average CTP is stringent, caching less popular contents at
BSs may be helpful for maintaining the level of average RTP.
In addition, we show that increasing the cache sizes at BSs
does not always improve the average RTP when the secrecy
constraint on the average CTP is taken into account.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model and formulates a secrecy perfor-
mance optimization problem. Section III analyzes the secrecy
performance and derives the closed-form expressions for the
average RTP and CTP. Based on these analytical results,
Section IV develops two algorithms to solve the formulated
optimization problem. Numerical results and the related dis-
cussions are provided in Section V. Finally, Section VI draws
the conclusions. Unless otherwise specified, the notations used
throughout the paper are summarized in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
We consider the secure downlink transmissions in a large-
scale cache-enabled HetNet, in which the BSs from K co-
channel deployed network tiers transmit to the users in the
presence of randomly distributed jammers and eavesdroppers.
For ease of illustration, we denote the set of K tiers by
K , {1, 2, · · · ,K}. We assume that each BS in tier k is
active (as in [8], [10], [12]) and has Mk antennas, while the
users, the jammers, and the eavesdroppers are equipped with
a single antenna each.1 The eavesdroppers secretly intercept
the downlink transmissions, while the jammers constantly
broadcast the jamming signals into the channel to interrupt the
downlink transmissions. The jammers and the eavesdroppers
are not colluding, and therefore the jamming signals also
interfere with the eavesdroppers. The BS locations in tier k
and the jammers are modeled by independent homogeneous
Poisson point processes (PPPs) Φk and ΦJ with densities λk
and λJ,
2 respectively. In addition, the locations of the users
and eavesdroppers are modeled by some other independent
stationary point processes with certain densities.
We assume a interference-limited communication environ-
ment, in which the wireless channels undergo quasi-static
Rayleigh fading along with a large-scale path loss. Specifically,
we denote hbk,x ∈ C
Mk×1 (gj,x ∈ C) as the small-scale
fading vector (coefficient) between BS bk ∈ Φk (jammer
j ∈ ΦJ) and receiver x ∈ {, e}, where C denotes the
complex number domain,  and e represent the user and
the eavesdropper, respectively. As such, all the entries of
hbk,x and gj,x are identical and independent distributed (i.i.d.)
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and unit variance. For the path loss model, we use
the standard power loss propagation model, i.e., the power of
1 We understand that the scenario where the users, the jammers, and
the eavesdroppers are all equipped with multiple antennas is more general,
interesting, as well as challenging. For analytical tractability, we leave it for
future work.
2In practice, the density of the jammers can be estimated by using the
jammer detection policies [24].
3TABLE I. List of Notations.
Notation Definition
K Set of network tiers.
K Number of tiers.
Φk Point process of the BSs in tier k.
λk Spatial density of the BSs in tier k.
Mk Number of antennas at each BS in tier k.
Pk Transmit power of each BS in tier k.
ΦJ Point process of the jammers.
λJ Spatial density of the jammers.
C The complex number domain.
 Notation representing for user.
e Notation representing for eavesdropper.
hbk,x Small-scale fading vector between BS bk ∈ Φk and
receiver x ∈ {, e}.
gj,x Small-scale fading coefficient between jammer j ∈
ΦJ and receiver x ∈ {, e}.
α Path-loss exponent.
N Set of files in the network.
N Number of files in the network.
an Popularity of file n.
a Popularity distribution of files in N .
Ck Cache size of each BS in tier k.
Tn,k Caching probability of file n in tier k.
T Caching distribution of the N files.
Φn,k Point processes of the BSs in tier k which store file n.
Φ−n,k Point processes of the BSs in tier k which do not store
file n.
sbk The information-bearing signal at BS bk.
ℓ(bk) The served user of BS bk.
νbk Artificial noise vector at BS bk.
wbk Beamforming vector at BS bk.
Wbk The matrix for transmitting the artificial noise at
BS bk.
φk Fraction of power allocated to the signal sbk .
ℓ,0 A typical user.
ℓe,0 A typical eavesdropper.
rbk,ℓ,0 Distance between BS bk and ℓ,0.
rbk,ℓe,0 Distance between BS bk and ℓe,0.
dj,ℓ,0 Distance between jammer j and ℓ,0.
dj,ℓe,0 Distance between jammer j and ℓe,0.
bn,k,0 Index of the serving BS of ℓ,0 in tier k,0 ∈ K.
bn,ke,0 Index of an arbitrary BS storing file n in tier ke,0 ∈ K.
R Target transmission rate of the wiretap code.
Rs Secrecy rate of the wiretap code.
Re Redundancy rate against eavesdropping.
ǫ A given level of confidentiality.
p
,n(Tn) RTP of file n.
p

(T) Average RTP.
p
e,n(Tn) CTP of file n.
p
e
(T) Average RTP.
the transmitted signal with distance r is attenuated by a factor
rα, where α > 2 denotes the path-loss exponent.
We consider that there exist N files, denoted by the set
N , {1, 2, · · · , N}, to be cached in the considered HetNet.
All the files have the same size (as in [7]–[13]) and each file
n ∈ N has its own popularity (i.e., the probability that file
n is requested by a user), denoted by an ∈ [0, 1], where∑
n∈N an = 1. Without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), we
assume that a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ aN . As such, the popularity
distribution among N can be denoted by a , (an)n∈N ∈
[0, 1]N×1, which we assume known a priori. We note that this
assumption is practical due to the fact that the file popularity
evolves at a slower timescale, thus various methods can be
employed to estimate the file popularity over time [25]. We
consider a discrete-time system with time being slotted. In
each time slot, each user randomly requests one file according
to the file popularity a. We study one slot in the network.
B. Random Caching and User Association
We consider that each BS in tier k is equipped with a cache
unit of size Ck (in files), Ck ≤ N . As in [7]–[13], file n is
stored at each BS in tier k ∈ K with a certain probability
Tn,k ∈ [0, 1], referred to as the caching probability of file n in
tier k. We denote T , (Tn)n∈N ∈ [0, 1]
NK×1, where Tn ,
(Tn,k)k∈K ∈ [0, 1]K×1, as the caching distribution of the N
files in the K-tier HetNet. Then, the relationship between the
caching probability of file n in tier k and the cache sizes of
the BSs in tier k can be expressed as [11]–[13]:
0 ≤ Tn,k ≤ 1, n ∈ N , k ∈ K, (1)∑
n∈N
Tn,k = Ck, k ∈ K. (2)
Let Φn,k ⊆ Φk and Φ−n,k ⊆ Φk, n ∈ N denote the point
processes of the BSs in tier k which store and do not store
file n, respectively. Then, we have Φn,k
⋃
Φ−n,k = Φk. Due
to the random caching and independent thinning [26], we
know that Φn,k and Φ−n,k are two thinned and independent
homogeneous PPPs with densities λkTn,k and λk(1 − Tn,k),
respectively.
We now describe the user association rule adopted in this
paper. Consider a user requesting file n at the beginning of a
slot. If file n is not stored in the HetNet, it will not be served.3
Otherwise, it will be associated with a BS which not only
stores file n but also provides the maximum long-term average
received information signal power (ARISP) among all BSs in
the K-tier HetNet. This BS is referred to as the users’ serving
BS and such association mechanism is called the content-
based user association. Note that, under this association, a
user may not be associated with the BS which provides the
maximum ARISP if it has not stored file n. As a result, the user
usually receives a weak signal compared with the interference,
and thus may not successfully receive the requested file and
benefit from content diversity offered by random caching. To
overcome this drawback, we assume that the channel state
information (CSI) of each user is available at its serving BS
and the serving BS adopts the maximal ratio transmission to
deliver the requested files.4
C. Artificial-Noise-Aided Transmission
In order to deliberately confuse eavesdroppers in the HetNet
while guaranteeing the reliable links to the users, we consider
that each BS employs the artificial-noise-aided transmission
strategy. Let sbk denote the information-bearing signal with
E[|sbk |
2] = 1 and νbk ∈ C
(Mk−1)×1 denote the artificial
3Note that in this work, we only study serving cached files at BSs to
get first-order insights into the design of cache-enabled K-tier HetNets and
characterize the benefits of caching, as in [7], [8], [13]. BSs may serve those
uncached files through other service mechanisms, the investigation of which
is beyond the scope of this paper.
4Note that, the analytical framework developed in this paper can be
extended to other beamforming techniques.
4ybn,kx,0 ,ℓx,0
=hTbn,kx,0 ,ℓx,0
sˆbn,kx,0
r
−α2
bn,kx,0 ,ℓx,0
+
∑
k∈K
∑
bk∈Φn,k\{bn,kx,0}
h
T
bk,ℓx,0 sˆbkr
−α2
bk,ℓx,0
+
∑
k∈K
∑
bk∈Φ−n,k
h
T
bk,ℓx,0 sˆbkr
−α2
bk,ℓx,0
+
∑
j∈ΦJ
√
PJgj,ℓx,0d
−α2
j,ℓx,0
. (4)
SIRbn,kx,0 ,ℓx,0=
∣∣∣hTbn,kx,0 ,ℓx,0wbn,kx,0
∣∣∣2r−αbn,kx,0 ,ℓx,0
Ix
bn,kx,0
+
∑
k∈K(I
x
n,k
+ Ix−n,k) + I
x
J
. (5)
noise vector at BS bk. As per the rules of the artificial-noise-
aided transmission strategy, all the entries of νbk are i.i.d.
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and variance 1
Mk−1
. Then, the transmitted signal
from BS bk ∈ Φk can be expressed as
sˆbk =
√
φkPkwbksbk +
√
(1− φk)PkWbkνbk , (3)
where Pk denotes the transmit power of BS bk ∈ Φk,
φk ∈ (0, 1] denotes the fraction of power allocated to the
information-bearing signal sbk , wbk =
hbk,ℓ(bk)
‖hbk,ℓ(bk)‖
is the
beamforming vector at BS bk with ℓ(bk) representing the
served user of BS bk and ‖h‖ denoting the 2-norm of a vector
h, and Wbk ∈ C
Mk×(Mk−1) is the matrix for transmitting the
artificial noise at BS bk. We choose Wbk as the projection
matrix into the null space of hbk,ℓ(bk). As such, the artificial
noise will not interfere with user ℓ(bk).
D. Received Signal-to-Interference Ratios
In this paper, w.l.o.g., according to Slivnyak’s Theorem [26],
we focus on a typical receiver ℓx,0, x ∈ {, e} located at the
origin.5 Let rbk,ℓx,0 (dj,ℓx,0) denote the distance between BS
bk ∈ Φk (jammer j ∈ ΦJ) and ℓx,0. Based on (3), the received
signal at ℓx,0 is given by (4), as shown at the top of this page,
where bn,k,0 ∈ Φn,k,0 denotes the index of the serving BS of
the typical user ℓ,0 in tier k,0 ∈ K,6 bn,ke,0 ∈ Φn,ke,0 denotes
the index of an arbitrary BS storing file n in tier ke,0 ∈ K,
and (·)T denotes the conjugate transpose operation. Then, the
SIR at ℓx,0 can be expressed as (5), as shown at the top of this
page, where Ixbn,kx,0
, Ixn,k, I
x
−n,k and I
x
J
denote the power of
artificial noise from BS bn,kx,0 , the interference and artificial
noise from the BSs with storing file n in tier k, the interference
and artificial noise from the BSs without storing file n in tier
k, and the interference from jammers, respectively, given by
(6)–(9), as shown at the top of the next page. Here, ξk is
defined as
ξk ,
{
0, if Mk = 1,
φ
−1
k
−1
Mk−1
, if Mk = 2, 3, · · · .
(10)
Note that, we have |gj,ℓx,0 |
2 d∼ exp(1),
|hTbk,ℓx,0wbk |
2 d∼ exp(1),7 ‖hTbk,ℓx,0Wbk‖
2 d∼Γ(Mk − 1, 1),
5A typical user (eavesdropper) is a user (an eavesdropper) that is randomly
selected from all the users (eavesdroppers) in the network.
6The serving BS bn,k,0 of the typical user ℓ,0 is determined according
to the content-based user association policy in Section II-B.
7Note that X
d
∼Y means that the random variable X follows the distribu-
tion Y .
‖hTbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0
Wbn,ke,0 ‖
2 d∼Γ(Mke,0 − 1, 1), and
‖hTbn,k,0 ,ℓx,0
Wbn,k,0 ‖
2= 0 due to the orthogonality between
hbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0 and Wbn,k,0 [27].
Based on (5), the SIR at the typical user ℓ,0 can be further
written as
SIRbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0=
∣∣∣hTbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0wbn,k,0
∣∣∣2r−αbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0∑
k∈K(I

n,k
+ I−n,k) + I

J
, (11)
where we have |hTbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0
wbn,k,0 |
2 d
∼Γ(Mk,0 , 1) and
Ibn,k,0
= 0 due to ‖hTbn,k,0 ,ℓx,0
Wbn,k,0 ‖
2= 0. On the
other hand, the SIR at the typical eavesdropper ℓe,0 can be
rewritten as
SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0=
∣∣∣hTbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0wbn,ke,0
∣∣∣2r−αbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0
Ie
bn,ke,0
+
∑
k∈K(I
e
n,k
+ Ie−n,k) + I
e
J
, (12)
where we have |hTbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0
wbn,ke,0 |
2 d
∼ exp(1).
E. Problem Formulation
According to [28]–[31], in order to perform the secure
transmission in the considered HetNet, a wiretap code with
the parameter pair (R, Rs) needs to be constructed, where
R and Rs denote the target transmission rate and secrecy
rate of the wiretap code (both in bps/Hz), respectively. Then
the difference Re = R − Rs is regarded as the redundancy
rate against eavesdropping. If the channel capacity between
the BS and a user is greater than or equal to R, the user
is able to decode its desired file. As such, the reliability of
file transmission is achieved. If the channel capacity between
each BS to an eavesdropper is less than or equal to Re,
the eavesdropper cannot decode any file. In this case, the
confidentiality of file transmission is achieved.
Based on the above discussions, we define the reliable
transmission probability (RTP) of file n as the probability
that the transmission of file n is reliable. Mathematically, it is
given by
p
,n(Tn) , Pr
[
log2
(
1 + SIRbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0
)
≥ R
]
. (13)
Similarly, we define the confidential transmission probability
(CTP) of file n as the probability that the transmission of file
n is confidential, which is expressed as (14), as shown at the
top of the next page.
Remark 1 (Interpretation of RTP and CTP of file n): The
RTP and the CTP of file n measure the transmission reliability
and the transmission confidentiality of file n, respectively.
5I
x
bn,kx,0
= ξkx,0
∥∥∥hTbn,kx,0 ,ℓx,0Wbn,kx,0
∥∥∥2 r−αbn,kx,0 ,ℓx,0 , (6)
I
x
n,k =
∑
bk∈Φn,k\{bn,kx,0}
φkPk
φkx,0Pkx,0
(∣∣∣hTbk,ℓx,0wbk ∣∣∣2 + ξk ∥∥∥hTbk,ℓx,0Wbk∥∥∥2
)
r
−α
bk,ℓx,0
, (7)
I
x
−n,k =
∑
bk∈Φ−n,k
φkPk
φkx,0Pkx,0
(∣∣∣hTbk,ℓx,0wbk ∣∣∣2 + ξk ∥∥∥hTbk,ℓx,0Wbk∥∥∥2
)
r
−α
bk,ℓx,0
, (8)
I
x
J =
∑
j∈ΦJ
PJ
φkx,0Pkx,0
∣∣gj,ℓx,0∣∣2 d−αj,ℓx,0 . (9)
p
e,n(Tn) , Pr
[
max
ke,0∈K, bn,ke,0∈Φn,ke,0
log2
(
1 + SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0
)
≤ Re
]
. (14)
In addition, the RTP (CTP) of file n can be thought of
equivalently as i) the probability that a randomly chosen user
(eavesdropper) succeeds in (fails to) decode file n, or ii) the
average fraction of users (eavesdroppers) who at any time
succeed in (fail to) decode file n.
Since each file n ∈ N is requested with probability an,
according to the total probability theorem, the average RTP
and CTP of a file, denoted as p

(T) and p
e
(T), respectively,
are given by
p

(T) =
∑
n∈N
anp,n(Tn), (15)
p
e
(T) =
∑
n∈N
anpe,n(Tn), (16)
where T is the design parameter related to random caching.
From (15) and (16), we see that the caching distribution T
significantly affects both the RTP and the CTP. The key goal
of this paper is to optimize T to maximize the average RTP
of the system, subject to the caching size constraints in (1)
and (2) as well as the constraint on the average CTP of the
system, given by
p
e
(T) ≥ ǫ, (17)
where ǫ denotes a given level of confidentiality. Mathemati-
cally, the optimization problem can be formulated as
Problem 1 (Secrecy Performance Optimization):
T∗ ,argmax
T
p

(T)
s.t. (1), (2), (17),
where T∗ denotes an optimal solution.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In order to solve Problem 1, in this section, we analyze
p

(T) and p
e
(T). Specifically, we first derive the closed-form
expression of the RTP of file n, i.e., p
,n(T). Then, we derive
the closed-form expression of the CTP of file n, i.e., p
e,n(T).
Note that, by substituting p
,n(T) and pe,n(T) into (15) and
(16), respectively, we can directly obtain p

(T) and p
e
(T).
A. Analysis of RTP
In this subsection, we analyze p
,n(T), using tools from
stochastic geometry. To calculate p
,n(T), based on (11), we
first need to analyze the distribution of the SIR, SIRbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0 .
Under random caching, we note that the interferers for the
typical user ℓ,0 can be classified into three categories, i.e., i)
the interfering BSs storing the requested file of ℓ,0 in each
tier, ii) the interfering BSs without the requested file of ℓ,0
in each tier, iii) all the jamemrs in the network. In addition,
under artificial-noise-aided transmission strategy, the artificial
noise is embedded into the information signal transmitted from
each BS in the network. Taking the impacts of these three
categories of interferers and the artificial noise on the SIR of
the typical user into account, we can derive the distribution
of SIRbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0 and then p,n(T), as summarized in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 (RTP of file n): The RTP of file n is given by
p
,n(Tn) =
K∑
j=1
λjTn,j
(
φjPj
)δ ∥∥∥Q−1Mj (Tn)
∥∥∥
1
, (18)
where ‖·‖1 is the L1 induced matrix norm and QM (Tn) is a
lower triangular Toeplitz matrix, i.e.,
QM (Tn) =


q0(Tn) 0 0 0
q1(Tn) q0(Tn) 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
qM−1(Tn) · · · q1(Tn) q0(Tn)

 . (19)
Here, qm(Tn) = fm(Tn, θ), θ , 2
R − 1, m =
0, 1, · · · ,Mj−1, where fm(Tn, θ) is given by (20), as shown
at the top of the next page, with Um,M (ξ, θ), Vm,M (ξ, θ) and
Wm(θ) given by (21)–(23), respectively, as shown at the top
of the next page. Here, ηm(i, ξ, θ) ,
(i+1)(m)δ
m!(δ−m) ξ
m+1
2F1(m−
δ,m + i + 1;m − δ + 1;−ξθ)θm, κm(i, ξ, θ) ,
(−1)mδ(m)Γ(i+δ−1)
m!Γ(i−1) Γ(1− δ)ξ
δ+1θδ , 2F1 (a, b; c; z) and Γ(x, y)
denote the Gauss hypergeometric function and Gamma func-
tion, respectively, and x(m) , x(x − 1) · · · (x −m + 1) and
x(m) , x(x+1) · · · (x+m− 1) denote the falling and rising
factorials, respectively.8
Proof : See Appendix A. 
We note that Theorem 1 provides a closed-form expression
for p
,n(Tn). In Fig. 1, we plot p,n(Tn) versus R for differ-
ent values of λJ. We see that the “Analytical” curves, generated
from Theorem 1, accurately match the points obtained from
8Note that when m = 0, we define x(0) = x
(0)
= 1.
6fm(Tn, θ) ,
K∑
k=1
λk(φkPk)
δ
(
Tn,kUm,Mk(ξk, θ) +
(
1− Tn,k
)
Vm,Mk (ξk, θ)
)
+Wm(θ), (20)
Um,M (ξ, θ) ,


ηm (M − 1, 1, θ) , if ξ = 1,
1
(1−ξ)M−1
(
ηm (0, 1, θ)−
M−2∑
i=0
(1− ξ)iηm(i, ξ, θ)
)
, otherwise,
(21)
Vm,M (ξ, θ) ,


κm (M + 1, 1, θ) , if ξ = 1,
1
(1−ξ)M−1
(
κm (2, 1, θ)−
M−2∑
i=0
(1− ξ)iκm(i+ 2, ξ, θ)
)
, otherwise,
(22)
Wm(θ) , λJP
δ
J κm (2, 1, θ) . (23)
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Fig. 1. p
,n(Tn) versus R at K = 2, M1 = 4, M2 = 2, φ1 = 0.9,
φ2 = 0.5, P1 = 20 W, P2 = 0.13 W, PJ = 1 W, λ1 =
1
2502π
,
λ2 =
1
502π
, λJ =
1
1502π
, α = 3.5, Tn,1 = 0.9 and Tn,2 = 0.8.
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Fig. 2. (a) p
,n(Tn) versus PJ. (b) p,n(Tn) versus λJ. Here,
K = 2, M1 = 4, M2 = 2, φ1 = 0.9, φ2 = 0.5, P1 = 20 W,
P2 = 0.13 W, λ1 =
1
2502π
, λ2 =
1
502π
, α = 3.5, Tn,1 = 0.9 and
Tn,2 = 0.8.
the Monte Carlo simulations, thus verifying the accuracy of
the derived expression of p
,n(Tn) in Theorem 1.
Moreover, it is important to understand how p
,n(Tn) is
affected by some important system parameters, such as PJ, λJ,
Pk, λk and Tn. In the following, we provide some insights
into the behavior of p
,n(Tn) with respect to (w.r.t.) the above
parameters. However, due to the L1 induced matrix norm in
the expression of p
,n(Tn), it is extremely difficult to analyze
the effects of PJ, λJ, Pk, λk and Tn. To make progress, we
first derive the upper and lower bounds on p
,n(Tn) in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Upper and Lower Bounds of RTP of file n):
The RTP of file n satisfies pL
,n(Tn) ≤ p,n(Tn) ≤ p
U
,n(Tn),
where
pU
,n(Tn) = 1−
K∑
k=1
Mk∑
m=0
(
Mk
m
)
(−1)mλkTn,k (φkPk)
δ
f0(Tn,mSMkθ)
, (24)
pL
,n(Tn) =
K∑
k=1
λkTn,k (φkPk)
δ∑Mk−1
m=0
(
1− mMk
)
fm(Tn, θ)
. (25)
Here, SMk = (Mk! )
−M−1
k and fm(Tn, θ) is given by (20).
Proof : See Appendix B. 
The tightness of pL
,n(Tn) and p
U
,n(Tn) are evaluated
in Fig. 1. We can see that pL
,n(Tn) and p
U
,n(Tn) have
the similar trends as p
,n(Tn), which show the correctness
of our analysis in Proposition 1. In addition, we see that,
compared to pL
,n(Tn), p
U
,n(Tn) tightly matches p,n(Tn),
and thus can serve as a good approximation for p
,n(Tn).
Based on Proposition 1, some properties of p
,n(Tn) are
established as follows.
Property 1 (Effects of Jammer Transmit Power and Density):
pL
,n(Tn) increases with PJ and λJ.
Proof : The proof is straightforward and we omit it for
brevity. 
Property 1 indicates that the jammers will degrade the
transmission reliability of file n, since the jamming signals
degrade the link qualities of the typical user’s channels. Fig. 2
plots p
,n(Tn) versus PJ and λJ. From this figure, we see that
although Property 1 is obtained based on pL
,n(Tn), it holds
for p
,n(Tn) as well. To obtain more insights, we consider
a special case where all the BSs have the same number of
antennas M and power allocation ratio φ, i.e., Mk = M and
φk = φ, for all k ∈ K. In this special case, we can further
obtain the following properties.
Property 2 (Effects of BS Transmit Power and Density When
Mk = M and φk = φ, k ∈ K): When Mk = M and φk = φ,
for all k ∈ K, pL
,n(Tn) increases with Pk and λk if Tn,k ≥
T
,th
n,k , and decrease with Pk and λk otherwise, where T
,th
n,k is
given by (26), as shown at the top of the next page, and ξ is
given by
ξ ,
{
0, if M = 1,
φ−1−1
M−1 , if M = 2, 3, · · · .
Proof : Denote zk , λkP
δ
k . When Mk =M and φk = φ,
7T
,th
n,k
=
∑M−1
m=0
(
1− mM
)
Vm,M (ξ, θ)
∑K
i6=j λiP
δ
i Tn,iφ
δ∑M−1
m=0
(
1− mM
)
Vm,M (ξ, θ)
∑K
i6=j λiP
δ
i φ
δ +
∑M−1
m=0
(
1− mM
)
Wm(θ)
. (26)
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Fig. 3. (a) p
,n(Tn) versus P2. (b) p,n(Tn) versus λ2. Here,
K = 2, M1 = M2 = 4, φ1 = 0.9, φ2 = 0.5, P1 = 20 W, PJ = 1
W, λ1 =
1
2502π
, λJ =
1
1502π
, α = 3.5, R = 1.3 bps/Hz, and
Tn,1 = 0.9.
for all k ∈ K, we rewrite (25) as
pL
,n(Tn) =
∑K
k=1 zkTn,kφ
δ
fm(Tn, θ)
. (27)
Then, based on (27), we have

∂pL
,n
(Tn)
∂Pk
=
∂pL
,n
(Tn)
∂zk
∂zk
∂Pk
∂pL
,n
(Tn)
∂λk
=
∂pL
,n
(Tn)
∂zk
∂zk
∂λk
, (28)
where ∂zk
∂Pk
= δλkP
δ−1
k ,
∂zk
∂λk
= P δk and
∂pL
,n(Tn)
∂zk
=
Tn,kφ
δ∑K
j 6=k zjTn,jφ
δ
(fm(Tn, θ))
2
M−1∑
m=0
(
1−
m
M
)
Vm,M (ξ, θ)φ
δ
−
φδ
∑K
j 6=k zjTn,jφ
δ
(fm(Tn, θ))
2
M−1∑
m=0
(
1−
m
M
)
Vm,M (ξ, θ).
Finally, by letting
∂pL
,n
(Tn)
∂Pk
≥ 0 and
∂pL
,n
(Tn)
∂λk
≥ 0 or
∂pL
,n
(Tn)
∂Pk
< 0 and
∂pL
,n
(Tn)
∂λk
< 0, we obtain the desired
result in (26), which completes the proof. 
Property 2 indicates that if the caching probability of file
n in tier k is relatively low, then increasing the BS transmit
power or density in this tier will decrease the transmission
reliability of file n. This can be explained as follows. If file
n is stored in tier k with a very low probability, all the BSs
in this tier will be the interferer of the typical user. As such,
the increase of the BS transmit power or density in tier k will
increase the interference suffered by the typical user. Fig. 3
plots p
,n(Tn) versus P2 and λ2. From the figure, we see that
Property 2 also holds for p
,n(Tn).
Property 3 (Effect of Caching Probability When Mk = M
and φk = φ, k ∈ K): When Mk = M and φk = φ, for all
k ∈ K, pL
,n(Tn) increases with Tn,k.
Proof : See Appendix C. 
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Fig. 4. p
,n(Tn) versus Tn,2, where K = 2, M1 = M2 = 4,
φ1 = 0.9, φ2 = 0.5, P1 = 20 W, P2 = 0.13 W, PJ = 1 W,
λ1 =
1
2502π
, λ2 =
1
502π
, λJ =
1
1502π
, α = 3.5, and Tn,1 = 0.9.
Property 3 indicates that caching a file at more BSs will
always increase the transmission reliability of this file. This is
because the average distance between a user requesting file n
and its serving BS decreases with the caching probability Tn,k.
Fig. 4 plots p
,n(Tn) versus Tn,k, from which we observe that
Property 3 also holds for p
,n(Tn).
Finally, we study the concavity and convexity of pL
,n(Tn)
and pU
,n(Tn) w.r.t. Tn, as follows.
Property 4 (Concavity and Convexity of pL
,n(Tn) and
pU
,n(Tn) w.r.t. Caching Probability When Mk = M and
φk = φ, k ∈ K): When Mk = M and φk = φ, for
all k ∈ K, pL
,n(Tn) is a concave function of Tn,k, and
pU
,n(Tn) = p
U,1
,n(Tn) − p
U,2
,n(Tn) + 1 is a difference-of-
concave (DC) function of Tn,k, where
pU,i
,n(Tn) =
∑
m∈Mi
(
M
m
) ∑
k∈K
λkTn,k (φPk)
δ
f0(Tn,mSMθ)
, i = 1, 2. (29)
Here, pU,i
,n(Tn) is a concave function of Tn,k, M
1 and
M2 denote the sets of the odd and even numbers in set
{0, 1, 2, · · · ,M}, respectively,
Proof : See Appendix D. 
B. Analysis of CTP
In this subsection, we analyze p
e,n(Tn), using tools from
stochastic geometry. To derive p
e,n(Tn), we must derive
the joint probability distribution of SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0 for all
ke,0 ∈ K, bn,ke,0 ∈ Φn,ke,0 , which, however, is extremely chal-
lenging due to the fact that the variables SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0 , for
all ke,0 ∈ K, bn,ke,0 ∈ Φn,ke,0 are correlated with each other.
In order to make progress, motivated by [32], we focus on
the high redundancy rate scenario, i.e., Re > 1 bps/Hz. Note
that, it shows in [32, Lemma 1] that in this scenario, at most
one BS in the entire network can provide channel capacity
greater than Re, i.e., the typical eavesdropper can successfully
decode message from at most one BS. Then, in this scenario,
by carefully characterizing the impact of random caching and
the artificial-noise-aided transmission strategy on the distri-
bution of SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0 , for each ke,0 ∈ K, bn,ke,0 ∈ Φn,ke,0 ,
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Fig. 5. p
e,n(Tn) versus Re at K = 2, M1 = 4, M2 = 2, φ1 = 0.9,
φ2 = 0.5, P1 = 20 W, P2 = 0.13 W, PJ = 1 W, λ1 =
1
2502π
,
λ2 =
1
502π
, α = 3.5, Tn,1 = 0.8 and Tn,2 = 0.7.
we can derive the distribution of SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0 , for each
ke,0 ∈ K, bn,ke,0 ∈ Φn,ke,0 and then pe,n(Tn), as summarized
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (CTP of file n): When Re > 1, the CTP of file
n is given by
p
e,n(Tn)
= 1−
∑K
k=1 λkTn,k(φkPk)
δ(1 + ξkθe)
1−Mk
W0(θe) +
∑K
k=1 λk(φkPk)
δ
V0,Mk (ξk, θe)
, (30)
where θe , 2
Re − 1, V0,M (ξ, θ) and W0(θ) are given by (22)
and (23), respectively.
Proof : See Appendix E. 
We note that Theorem 2 provides a closed-form expression
for p
e,n(Tn) in the high redundancy rate scenario. In Fig. 5,
we plot p
e,n(Tn) versus Re for different values of λJ. We
see that the “Analytical” curves, obtained from Theorem 2,
closely match the “Monte Carlo” simulation points, indicating
that Theorem 2 can also serve as a good approximation for
p
e,n(Tn) in the low redundancy rate scenario.
Based on Theorem 2, we can obtain important insights into
the behavior of p
e,n(Tn) w.r.t the system parameters (e.g., PJ,
λJ, Pk, λk and Tn), as follows.
Property 5 (Effects of Jammer Transmit Power and Density):
p
e,n(Tn) increases with PJ and λJ.
Proof : The proof is straightforward and we omit it for
brevity. 
Property 5 indicates that, although the jammers in the
HetNets can degrade the transmission reliability of file n, they
can improve the transmission confidentiality of this file, as
shown in Fig. 6. This is because the jamming signals degrade
the link qualities of the eavesdropper’s channels.
Property 6 (Effects of BS Transmit Power and Density):
p
e,n(Tn) decreases with Pk and λk if Tn,k ≥ T
e,th
n,k , and
increases with Pk and λk otherwise, where
T
e,th
n,k
=
V0,Mk (ξk, θe)
∑K
j=1,j 6=k λjP
δ
j Tn,jφ
δ
j
(
1 + ξjθe
)1−Mj
(1 + ξkθe)
1−Mk
(
W0(θe) +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
λjP
δ
j φ
δ
jV0,Mj
(
ξj , θe
)) .
Proof : The proof is similar to that in Property 2 and we
omit it for brevity. 
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Fig. 6. (a) p
e,n(Tn) versus PJ. (b) pe,n(Tn) versus λJ. Here,
K = 2, M1 = 4, M2 = 2, φ1 = 0.9, φ2 = 0.5, P1 = 20 W,
P2 = 0.13 W, λ1 =
1
2502π
, λ2 =
1
502π
, α = 3.5, Tn,1 = 0.9 and
Tn,2 = 0.8.
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Fig. 7. (a) p
e,n(Tn) versus P2. (b) pe,n(Tn) versus λ2. Here,
K = 2, M1 = M2 = 4, φ1 = φ2 = 0.5, P1 = 20 W, PJ = 1
W, λ1 =
1
2502π
, λJ =
1
1502π
, α = 3.5, Re = 1.1 bps/Hz, and
Tn,1 = 0.9.
Property 6 indicates that if the caching probability of file n
in tier k is relatively low, then increasing the transmit power or
density of the BSs from this tier will increase the transmission
confidentiality of file n. This is because increasing the transmit
power or density of the BSs will result in an increase in
the interference received by the eavesdroppers. Fig. 7 verifies
Property 6.
Property 7 (Effect of Caching Probability): p
e,n(Tn) de-
creases with Tn,k.
Proof : From (30), we have
∂pe,n(Tn)
∂Tn,k
= −
λk(φkPk)
δ(1 + ξkθe)
1−Mk
W0(θe) +
∑K
k=1 λk(φkPk)
δ
V0,Mk (ξk, θe)
.
Obviously, we see that
∂p
e,n
(Tn)
∂Tn,k
< 0 is a constant w.r.t. Tn,k,
which completes the proof of this property . 
Property 7 indicates that caching a file at more BSs will
compromise the transmission confidentiality of this file, since
caching the file at more BSs incurs a higher risk of being
eavesdropped. Fig. 8 verifies Property 7.
Property 8 (Linearity of p
e,n(Tn) w.r.t. Caching Probabil-
ity): p
e,n(Tn) is a linear function of Tn,k.
Proof : The proof is straightforward and we omit it for
brevity. 
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Fig. 8. p
e,n(Tn) versus Tn,2, where K = 2, M1 = 4, M2 = 2,
φ1 = 0.9, φ2 = 0.5, P1 = 20 W, P2 = 0.13 W, PJ = 1 W,
λ1 =
1
2502π
, λ2 =
1
502π
, λJ =
1
1502π
, α = 3.5, Re = 1.2 bps/Hz,
and Tn,1 = 0.9.
In section IV, we shall see that this linearity of p
e,n(Tn)
will greatly facilitate the performance optimization.
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we focus on solving Problem 1. By substi-
tuting (18) into (15) and (30) into (16), the RTP p

(T) and
the CTP p
e
(T) are, respectively, calculated as (31) and (32),
as shown at the top of the next page.
Recall that the upper bound pU
,n(Tn) in (24) provides a
good approximation for p
,n(Tn) in (18), and p
U
,n(Tn) is
much more analytical than p
,n(Tn). Hence, in the following,
for simplicity and tractability, instead of maximizing p

(T)
directly, we maximize its upper bound, given by
pU

(T) =
∑
n∈N
anp
U
,n(Tn), (33)
where pU
,n(Tn) is given by (24). As such, we can transform
Problem 1 into the following problem
Problem 2 (Simplified Secrecy Performance Optimization):
T∗, argmax
T
pU

(T)
s.t. (1), (2), (17)
Problem 2 maximizes a non-concave objective function over
a linear set, denoted by T , {T ∈ [0, 1]NK |(1), (2), (17)},
and hence is a non-convex optimization problem in general.
Since the objective function pU

(T) is continuously differen-
tiable on T , we can obtain a stationary point9 of Problem 2
by using the gradient projection method (GPM) with a dimin-
ishing step size, denoted by ζ(t) with t = 0, 1, 2, · · · being
the iteration index. The details for solving Problem 2 using
GPM are summarized in Algorithm 1, where the diminishing
step size satisfies ζ(t) → 0, as t → ∞,
∑∞
t=1 ζ
(t) = ∞
and
∑∞
t=1(ζ
(t))2 < ∞ [33, pp. 227]. In addition, in Step 3
of Algorithm 1, ΠT (Tˆ) , argminT∈T ‖T − Tˆ‖ denotes
the Euclidean projection of Tˆ onto T , and ▽TpU (T
(t)) ,
(
∂pU

(T)
∂Tn,k
|
Tn,k=T
(t)
n,k
)n∈N ,k∈K is the gradient of p
U

(T) at T =
T(t), given by (34), as shown at the top of the next page. Here,
9Please note that for a non-convex problem, in general, there is no guarantee
that an optimal solution can be obtained. Instead, obtaining a stationary point,
i.e., a point that satisfies the corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions,
is the classic goal for solving a non-convex optimization problem [33].
Algorithm 1 Stationary Point of Problem 2 Based on GPM
1: initialization: choose a feasible initial point T(0) of Problem 2,
choose two positive constants εerr and tmax, and set t = 0.
2: repeat
3: compute T(t+1) according to T(t+1) =
ΠT
(
T(t) − ζ(t)▽Tp
U

(T(t))
)
.
4: set t← t+ 1.
5: until ‖T(t) −T(t−1)‖< εerr or t > tmax.
Algorithm 2 Stationary Point of Problem 2 Based on CCP
1: initialization: choose a feasible initial point T(0) of Problem 2,
choose two positive constants εerr and tmax, and set t = 0.
2: repeat
3: obtain T(t+1) by solving Problem 3.
4: set t← t+ 1.
5: until ‖T(t) −T(t−1)‖< εerr or t > tmax.
Λk(Mk, φk, θ) , λk(φkPk)
δ
(U0,Mk(ξk, θ)− V0,Mk(ξk, θ))
and Ψ(Mk, φk, θ) ,
∑
k∈K λk(φkPk)
δ
V0,Mk(ξk, θ)+W0(θ),
where Um,M (ξ, θ), Vm,M (ξ, θ) and Wm(θ) are given by
Theorem 1. According to [34], we know that the sequence
{T(t)}∞t=0 generated by Algorithm 1 converges to a stationary
point of Problem 2. The computation cost of Algorithm 1 is
dominated by the Euclidean projection at Step 3, which has the
computational complexity O
(
(KN)3
)
in the use of interior
point algorithm [35].
Note that, the convergence rate of Algorithm 1 is sensitive
to the choice of the step size. If it is chosen improperly, Al-
gorithm 1 may need a great number of iterations to converge.
Recall that in Property 4, in the special case of Mk = M and
φk = φ, for all k ∈ K, pU,n(Tn) has a DC structure. Thus, in
this case, Problem 2 becomes a DC optimization problem and
thus can be solved using convex-concave procedure (CCP)
[36]. Compared to GPM, CCP does not depend any step
size and thus may lead to robust convergence performance.
As such, in the following, we consider this special case and
develop an iterative algorithm to obtain a stationary point
of Problem 2 based on CCP. The core idea of CCP is
to linearize the convex term of the DC objective function
to obtain a concave objective function for a maximization
problem, and then solve a sequence of convex optimization
problems successively. Specifically, at iteration t + 1, based
on Property 4, we have the following approximation problem:
Problem 3 (Approximation of Problem 2 at Iteration t+ 1
When Mk = M and φk = φ, k ∈ K):
T
(t+1)
, argmax
T
∑
n∈N
an
(
pU,1
,n(Tn)− p˜
U,2
,n(Tn;T
(t)
n )
)
+ 1
s.t. (1), (2), (17),
where p˜
U,2
,n(Tn;T
(t)
n ) , pU,2,n(T
(t)
n ) + (Tn −
T
(t)
n )T▽Tnp
U,2
,n(T
(t)
n ), pU,i,n(Tn) is given by (29) and
▽Tnp
U,2
,n(T
(t)
n ) ,
(
∂pU,2
,n
(Tn)
∂Tn,k
|
Tn,k=T
(t)
n,k
)
k∈K
denotes the
gradient of pU,2
,n(Tn) at Tn = T
(t)
n , which is given by (35),
as shown at the top of the next page.
Due to the concave objective and linear constraints, Prob-
lem 3 is a convex problem, and thus can be solved by
an interior point method efficiently. The details for solving
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p

(T)=
∑
n∈N
an
∑
j∈K
λjTn,j
(
φjPj
)δ ∥∥∥Q−1Mj (Tn)
∥∥∥
1
, (31)
p
e
(T)=
∑
n∈N
an
(
1−
∑K
k=1 λkTn,k(φkPk)
δ(1 + ξkθe)
1−Mk
W0(θe) +
∑K
k=1 λk(φkPk)
δ
V0,Mk (ξk, θe)
)
. (32)
∂pU

(T)
∂Tn,k
= −an
Mk∑
m=1
(
Mk
m
)
(−1)m
f20 (Tn, mSMkθ)
( ∑
i∈K\{k}
λi(φiPi)
δ
Tn,iΛk(Mk, φk, mSMkθ)
+ λk(φkPk)
δ
( ∑
i∈K\{k}
Tn,iΛi(Mk, φk,mSMkθ) + Ψ(Mk, φk,mSMkθ)
))
. (34)
∂pU,2
,n(Tn)
∂Tn,k
=
∑
m∈M2
(
M
m
)
λk(φPk)
δ
f20 (Tn,mSMθ)

 ∑
i∈K\{k}
Tn,iΛi(M,φ,mSMθ) + Ψ(M,φ,mSMθ)


−
∑
i∈K\{k}
∑
m∈M2
(
M
m
)
λi(φPi)
δ
f20 (Tn,mSMθ)
Tn,iΛk(M,φ,mSMθ). (35)
Problem 2 using CCP are summarized in Algorithm 2. To
initialize Algorithm 2, we can randomly choose a point and
then project it onto the linear constraint set of Problem 2.
According to [36], we declare that the sequence {T(t)}∞t=0
generated by Algorithm 2 converges to a stationary point
of Problem 2. Similar as Algorithm 1, the computation cost
of Algorithm 2 is dominated by the solution of Problem 3
at Step 3 as well, which has the computational complexity
O
(
(KN)3
)
in the use of interior point algorithm [35].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to verify the
effectiveness of our proposed secure random caching scheme.
Specifically, we first demonstrate the convergence of Algo-
rithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Then, we compare the performance
of the proposed secure random caching scheme with that
of some existing baseline schemes. In the simulations, we
consider a two-tier HetNet, i.e., K = 2, consisting of a
macrocell network as the 1st tier overlaid with a picocell
network as the 2nd tier. Unless otherwise stated, the simulation
settings are as follows: εerr = 10
−6, tmax = 100, P1 = 20 W,
P2 = 0.13W, PJ = 1 W, λ1 =
1
2502π , λ2 =
1
252π , λJ =
1
2502π ,
α = 4, R = 1.3 bps/Hz, Rs = 0.2 bps/Hz, ǫ = 0.7,
M1 = M2 = 10, φ1 = φ2 = 0.9, C1 = 15, C2 = 10, N = 20
and an =
n−β∑
i∈N i
−β , where β = 0.6 is the Zipf exponent.
A. Convergence of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2
In Fig. 9, we present the convergence trajectories of Algo-
rithm 1 and Algorithm 2 as functions of iteration index for
five different initial points. We see that the convergence rate
of Algorithm 1 is highly sensitive to the choices of step size,
while Algorithm 2 has more robust convergence performance,
due to the fact that it does not rely on any step size. We
also see that, for different initial points, both Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2 converge to the same RTP, demonstrating their
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Fig. 9. Convergence of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. The step size
for Algorithm 1 is ζ(t) = c
2+t0.55
[13].
effectiveness in solving Problem 2. Moreover, compared to
Algorithm 2, the convergence trajectory of Algorithm 1 is not
monotonically decreasing, due to the Euclidean projection onto
the feasible set.
B. Performance Comparisons between Proposed Scheme and
Baselines
In Fig. 10 – Fig. 13, we examine the effects of system
parameters and demonstrate the superiority of our proposed
secure random caching schemes over two baseline schemes,
in terms of the average RTP. Specifically, Baseline 1 adopts
the most popular caching scheme, where each BS in tier k
selects the Ck most popular files to store [5], and Baseline 2
adopts the uniform caching scheme, where each BS in tier k
randomly selects Ck files to store, according to the uniform
distribution [6].
Fig. 10 shows the effect of the confidential level ǫ. Specif-
ically, in Fig. 10(a) we plot the average RTP versus ǫ. From
the figure, we can see that for a large ǫ, the two baseline
schemes may be infeasible (e.g., ǫ > 0.65 for the most
popular caching and ǫ > 0.75 for the uniform caching), but
our proposed secure random caching scheme may still be
feasible (e.g., ǫ < 0.81), at the cost of RTP decrement (e.g.,
0.65 < ǫ < 0.81). This can be explained as follows. The
11
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(b) Caching probability versus n and ǫ of our proposed secure random
caching scheme.
Fig. 10. Effect of confidential level.
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Fig. 11. (a) Effect of the jammer transmit power. (b) Effect of the
jammer density.
CTPs of the two baseline schemes (each with fixed caching
distribution of files) are deterministic if given the system
parameters. Therefore, the decrease of the confidential level
will easily violate the confidential level constraint in (17).
On the contrary, our proposed scheme can wisely adjust the
caching distribution of the files to increase the CTP such that
the confidential level constraint is satisfied. The corresponding
adjustment in caching distribution is illustrated in Fig. 10(b).
To be specific, in the region of ǫ < 0.65, a file with higher
popularity has a higher caching probability, while in the region
of ǫ ≥ 0.65, the caching probability of a file with higher
popularity gradually decreases with ǫ, which in turn leads to
a reduction of the average RTP.
In Fig. 11, we examine the effects of the transmit power and
density of the jammers, i.e., PJ and λJ. We first see that the
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Fig. 12. (a) Effect of the number of BS antennas in tier 1. (b) Effect
of the power allocation in tier 1. (c) Effect of the target transmission
rate. (d) Effect of the secrecy rate.
average RTP of each caching scheme decreases as PJ or λJ
increases, which verifies Property 1. We also see that, when
PJ or λJ is relatively high (e.g., PJ ≥ 90 W or λJ ≥
180
2502π ),
the most popular caching can achieve almost the same average
RTP as our secure random caching. This is because, when PJ
or λJ is large, the received SIR at the typical user is small.
As such, our secure random caching scheme tends to cache
the files with higher popularity in order to provide the largest
possible average RTP. In addition, we see that, when PJ or
λJ is low (e.g., PJ ≤ 1 W or λJ ≤
16
2502π ), the most popular
caching may be infeasible, but our secure random caching
scheme can still be feasible, demonstrating that compared
to the baselines, our proposed scheme can effectively resist
jamming attack.
Next, we examine the effects of the number of BS antennas
Mk, the power allocation φk, the target transmission rate R,
and the secrecy rate Rs in Fig. 12.
10 We see that, when M1 is
small, φ1 is low or R is large, the most popular caching
scheme can achieve almost the same average RTP as our
proposed secure random caching scheme, since caching the
most popular files at each BS can compensate lower received
SIR at the typical user. In addition, we also see that when φ1 is
large, R is small or Rs is large, the two baseline schemes may
be infeasible but our proposed schemes may still be feasible,
10In Fig. 12(a), the operation ⌈·⌉ denotes the ceiling function.
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Fig. 13. Effect of the cache size at ǫ = 0.6.
demonstrating that our schemes can well adapt to the changes
of these parameters.
Finally, we examine the effects of the cache size Ck in
Fig. 13. From the figure, we can see that, when the cache
size is large enough, the baselines may not be feasible, while
our proposed scheme can still be feasible, but at the cost of
the average RTP decrement. This observation indicates that
increasing the cache sizes at the BSs does not always increase
the average RTP, which is significantly different from the
observations in the existing works without considering the
secrecy constraints, e.g., [10]–[13]. This can be explained
as follows. If the cache size increases, for the most popular
caching scheme, each BS will store more files, while for the
uniform caching scheme, each file will be stored at more BSs,
both of which will increase the risk of eavesdropping, i.e., the
average CTP for the two baselines will decrease. If the average
CTP is below the given confidential level, the baselines will
be infeasible. On the other hand, our proposed secure caching
scheme can wisely adjust the caching distribution of the files
(i.e., reduce the caching probability of a file with higher
popularity as shown in Fig. 10(b)) to maintain the average CTP
above the given confidential level. However, such adjustment
leads to a reduction of the average RTP.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examine the security issue in the cache-
enabled large-scale multi-antenna HetNets, in which the multi-
antenna BSs deployed at multiple independent network-tiers
deliver their cached files to the requesting users in the pres-
ence of the eavesdroppers and the jammers. To confuse the
eavesdroppers, the BSs transmits artificial noise as well as
the useful signals, simultaneously. We first derive closed-form
expressions for the average RTP and the average CTP, char-
acterizing the impacts of the eavesdroppers and jammers on
the secrecy performance of the system. We then derive closed-
form upper and lower bounds for the RTP, which facilitates
us to understand the effects of key system parameters. In
addition, we propose a secure random caching scheme which
optimizes the caching distribution of the files to maximize the
average RTP of the system, while simultaneously meeting the
requirements on the caching sizes at the BSs and the average
CTP of the system. Numerical results show that the proposed
secure random caching scheme significantly outperforms the
existing baseline solutions.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Denote In ,
∑
k∈K(I

n,k + I

−n,k) + I

J
and θ , 2
R − 1.
Substituting (11) into (13), we have (36), as shown at the
top of the next page, where (a) is due to the fact that
|hTbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0
wbn,k,0 |
2 d
∼Γ(Mk,0 , 1) and Ak,0 is the proba-
bility that the typical user ℓ,0 is associated with tier k,0;
(b) follows from EIn
[
Imn e
−sIn
]
= (−1)m d
m
dsmLIn(s) with
dm
dsmLIn(s) denoting the m-order derivative of the Laplace
transform of random variable In, i.e., LIn(s) , EIn
[
e−sIn
]
;
and (c) uses the probability density function (p.d.f.) of the
distance rbn,j ,ℓ,0 , i.e., frbn,j,ℓ,0 (r0), which is given by
frbn,j ,ℓ,0 (r0)
=
2πλjTn,j
Aj
r0 exp
(
−r20
K∑
k=1
πλkTn,k
(
φkPk
φjPj
)δ)
. (37)
Thus, to calculate p
,n(Tn), we only need to calculate
dm
dsmLIn(s).
First, we calculate LIn(s). Note that we have LIn(s) =∏
k∈K LIn,k(s)LI−n,k(s)LIJ (s). In the following, we calcu-
late LI
n,k
(s), LI
−n,k
(s) and LI
J
(s), respectively. Let Xb ,
φkPk
φjPj
(|hTb,ℓ,0wb|
2
+ ξk‖hTb,ℓ,0Wb‖
2
) with the p.d.f. being
given by [37, Lemma 1]. We calculate LI
n,k
(s) as (38),
as shown at the top of the next page, where (d) follows
from the probability generating functional (PGFL) over PPP
and LXb (s) is the Laplace transform of Xb; (e) follows
from [38, eq. (49)] and A(s) and B(s) are, respectively,
given by (39) and (40), as shown at the top of the next
page, with ϕ(i, x) , 2F1
(
i, i+ δ; i+ δ + 1;−x−1
)
. Simi-
larly, LI
−n,k
(s) and LI
J
(s) are calculated as (41) and (42),
respectively, as shown at the top of the next page. Based on
(38), (41) and (42), we have
LIn(s) = exp (η(s)) , (43)
where η(s) is given by (44), as shown at the top
of the next page, with fk(s) ,
1
Tn,k
(
φkPk
φjPj
)δ
A(s) −
r20B(s) and gk(s) , r
2
0
(
2F1
(
−δ,Mk; 1− δ;−sr
−α
0
)
− 1
)
+(
1
Tn,k
− 1
)
sδ
Γ(Mk+δ)
Γ(Mk)
Γ(1− δ).
Next, we calculate d
mj
dsmj
LIn(s). Note that, directly com-
puting the derivatives will lead to intractable expressions. To
address this issue, according to [39, Lemma 1], we obtain the
following recursive relations
(−s)m
m!
dm
dsm
LIn(s) (45)
=


LIn(s), if m = 0,
m−1∑
i=0
m−i
m zm−i(s)
(−s)i
i!
di
dsi
LIn(s), if m = 1, 2, · · · ,
where
zm(s) =
(−s)m
m!
dm
dsm
η(s). (46)
From (45), we can see that in order to calculate d
m
dsmLIn(s),
we only need to calculate zm(s), which are related to the
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p
,n(Tn) =Ek,0Erbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0
EIn
[
Pr
[∣∣∣hTbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0wbn,k,0
∣∣∣2 ≥ θrαbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0In
]]
(a)
=
K∑
k,0=1
Ak,0Erbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0
EIn

Mk,0−1∑
mk,0=0
(
θr
α
bn,k,0 ,ℓ,0
In
)mk,0
mk,0 !
e
−θr
α
bn,k,0
,ℓ,0
In


(b)
=
K∑
j=1
AjErbn,j ,ℓ,0

Mj−1∑
mj=0
(−s)mj
mj !
dmj
dsmj
LIn (s)


∣∣∣∣∣∣
s=θrαbn,j,ℓ,0
(c)
=
K∑
j=1
Aj
∫ ∞
0
frbn,j ,ℓ,0 (r0)

Mj−1∑
mj=0
(−s)mj
mj !
dmj
dsmj
LIn (s)


∣∣∣∣∣∣
s=θrα0
dr0. (36)
LIn,k(s) = EI

n,k
[
e
−sIn,k
]
(d)
= exp

−2πλn,kTn,k
∫ ∞
(
φkPk
φjPj
) δ
2
r0
(
1− LXb(sv
−α)
)
vdv


(e)
=


exp
(
−πλkTn,k
(
φkPk
φjPj
)δ
r20
(
2F1
(
−δ,Mk; 1− δ;−sr
−α
0
)
− 1
))
, if ξk = 1,
exp
(
−πλkTn,k
((
φkPk
φjPj
)δ
A(s)− r20B(s)
))
, otherwise.
(38)
A(s),sδ
(
Γ(1 + δ)Γ(1− δ)
(1− ξk)
Mk−1
−
Mk−2∑
i=0
ξ1+δ
k
Γ(i+ δ + 1)Γ(1− δ)
(1− ξk)
Mk−i−1Γ(i+ 1)
)
, (39)
B(s),1−
δϕ(1, φkPkφjPj sr
−α
0 )
(1 + δ) (1− ξk)
Mk−1ξk
φkPk
φjPj
sr−α0
+
Mk−2∑
i=0
δξkϕ(i+ 1, ξk
φkPk
φjPj
sr−α0 )
(i+ δ + 1) (1− ξk)
Mk−i−1
(
ξk
φkPk
φjPj
sr−α0
)i+1 . (40)
LI
−n,k
(s)=


exp
(
−πλk
(
1− Tn,k
) (
φkPk
φjPj
)δ
sδ
Γ(Mk+δ)
Γ(Mk)
Γ(1− δ)
)
, if ξk = 1,
exp
(
−πλk
(
1− Tn,k
) (
φkPk
φjPj
)δ
A(s)
)
, otherwise,
(41)
LIJ(s)=exp
(
−πλJ
(
PJ
φjPj
)δ
s
δΓ(1 + δ)Γ(1− δ)
)
. (42)
η(s) =


−πλjTn,j
(
K∑
k=1
λkTn,k
λjTn,j
(
φkPk
φjPj
)δ
gk(s) +
λJ
λjTn,j
(
PJ
φjPj
)δ
sδΓ(1 + δ)Γ(1− δ)
)
, if ξk = 1,
−πλjTn,j
(
K∑
k=1
λkTn,k
λjTn,j
fk(s) +
λJ
λjTn,j
(
PJ
φjPj
)δ
sδΓ(1 + δ)Γ(1− δ)
)
, otherwise.
(44)
dm
dsm
η(s) =


−πλjTn,j
(
K∑
k=1
λkTn,k
λjTn,j
(
φkPk
φjPj
)δ
dm
dsm gk(s) +
λJ
λjTn,j
(
PJ
φjPj
)δ
Γ (1 + δ) Γ (1− δ) d
m
dsm s
δ
)
, if ξk = 1,
−πλjTn,j
(
K∑
k=1
λkTn,k
λjTn,j
dm
dsm fk(s) +
λJ
λjTn,j
(
PJ
φjPj
)δ
Γ (1 + δ) Γ (1− δ) d
m
dsm s
δ
)
, otherwise.
(47)
derivatives of η(s). As shown in [39], obtaining a closed-
form solution for d
m
dsm η(s) is generally much easier than for
dm
dsmLIn(s). Specifically, we have (47), as shown at the top
of this page, where d
m
dsm s
δ = δ(mj)s
δ−mj , d
m
dsm gk(s) and
dm
dsm fk(s) are given by (48) and (49), respectively, as shown
at the top of the next page. Here, d
m
dsm
1
s
ϕ(1, φkPk
φjPj
sr−α0 ) and
dm
dsm
1
si+1
ϕ(i + 1, ξk
φkPk
φjPj
sr−α0 ) can be calculated as (50) and
(51), respectively, as shown at the top of the next page. Based
on [39, Theorem 2], we have
Mj−1∑
mj=0
(−s)mj
mj !
dmj
dsmj
LIn (s)


∣∣∣∣∣∣
s=θrα0
=
∥∥∥eZMj ∥∥∥
1
, (52)
where ZM is the following M ×M lower triangular Toeplitz
matrix, i.e.,
ZM =


z0(θr
α
0 ) 0 0 0
z1(θr
α
0 ) z0(θr
α
0 ) 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
zM−1(θr
α
0 ) · · · z1(θr
α
0 ) z0(θr
α
0 )

, (53)
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0
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− 1
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Γ (Mk) sm−δ
δ(m), (48)
dm
dsm
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1
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Mk−1
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ξ1+δ
k
Γ (i+ 1 + δ) Γ (1 + δ)
(1− ξk)
Mk−i−1Γ (i+ 1)
)
δ(m)s
δ−m
+r20
(
δ
(1 + δ) (1− ξk)
Mk−1ξk
φkPk
φjPj
r−α0
dm
dsm
1
s
ϕ
(
1,
φkPk
φjPj
sr
−α
0
))
−r20

 δξk
∑Mk−2
i=0
dm
dsm
1
si+1
ϕ(i+ 1, ξk
φkPk
φjPj
sr−α0 )
(i+ 1 + δ) (1− ξk)
Mk−i−1
(
ξk
φkPk
φjPj
r−α0
)i+1

 . (49)
dm
dsm
1
s
ϕ
(
1,
φkPk
φjPj
sr
−α
0
)
=Γ (2 + δ) Γ (−δ)
φkPk
φjPj
r
−α−2
0 δ(m)s
δ−m +
Γ(2 + δ) Γ (δ)
Γ (1 + δ) Γ (1 + δ)
m! δ(m)
(1− δ)(m)
(
φkPk
φjPj
r
−α
0
)m+1
×2F1
(
1 +m,m− δ;m+ 1− δ;−
φkPk
φjPj
sr
−α
0
)
, (50)
dm
dsm
1
si+1
ϕ
(
i+ 1, ξk
φkPk
φjPj
sr
−α
0
)
=
Γ (i+ 2 + δ) Γ (−δ)
Γ (i+ 1)
(
ξk
φkPk
φjPj
r
−α
0
)δ+i+1
δ(m)s
δ−m
+
Γ (i+ 2 + δ) Γ (δ)
Γ (i+ 1 + δ) Γ (1 + δ)
(
ξk
φkPk
φjPj
r
−α
0
)m+i+1
(i+ 1)(m)δ(m)
(1− δ)(m)
×2F1
(
i+ 1 + k, k − δ; k + 1− δ;−ξk
φkPk
φjPj
sr
−α
0
)
. (51)
and its non-zero entries are determined by (46) with
s = θr
α
0 , i.e.,
zm(θr
α
0 )=
(−θr
α
0 )
m
m!
dm
dsm
η(s)
∣∣∣∣
s=θrα0
=−πXjr
2
0 (cm − 1[m = 0]) .
Here, Xj ,
∑K
k=1 λkTn,k
(
φkPk
φjPj
)δ
and cm ,
fm(Tn,θ)
(φjPj)
δXj
,
where fm(Tn, θ) is given by Theorem 1.
Finally, substituting (52) into (36), we have
p
,n(Tn)=
K∑
j=1
λjTn,j
Xj
∫ ∞
0
2πXjr0 exp
(
−πXjr
2
0
)∥∥∥eZMj ∥∥∥
1
dr0
(f)
=
K∑
j=1
λjTn,j
(
φjPj
)δ∥∥∥Q−1Mj
∥∥∥
1
.
where (f) follows from [39, Proposition 1] and uses the defini-
tion of QM in (19). The proof of Theorem 1 is completed. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The lower bound on p
,n(Tn) can be directly obtained by
using the Lemma 1 in [40], and thus we omit the details
due to page limitation. In the following, we focus on the
calculation of the upper bound on p
,n(Tn). Specifically,
based on the derivation in (36), we have (54), as shown at
the top of the next page, where (a) is due to the fact that
|hTbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0
wbn,k,0 |
2 d
∼Γ(Mk,0 , 1) and Ak,0 is the proba-
bility that the typical user ℓ,0 is associated with tier k,0;
(b) follows from a lower bound on the incomplete gamma
function, i.e.,
γ(a,b)
Γ(a) >
(
1− e−Sab
)a
for a > 1; and (c)
follows from the binomial expansion. Substituting (37) and
(43) into (54) and using some algebraic manipulations, we
obtain the upper bound on p
,n(Tn), as shown in (24). Thus,
we complete the proof. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPERTY 3
When Mk = M and φk = φ, for all k ∈ K,
based on (25), we have (55), as shown at the top of the
next page, where Vm,M (ξ, θ) and Wm(θ) are given by
(22) and (23), respectively. First, it is easy to see that∑M−1
m=0
(
1− m
M
)
Wm(θ) ≥ 0 due to Wm(θ) ≥ 0. De-
note Y ,
∑M−1
m=0
(
1− m
M
)
Vm,M (ξ, θ). Then, based on the
following Lemma 1, we have Y ≥ 0. Hence, we have
∂pL
,n
(Tn)
∂Tn,k
> 0, which completes the proof. 
Lemma 1 (Sign of Y ): We have Y ≥ 0.
Proof: According to (22), we consider the cases of
ξ = 1 and ξ 6= 1, respectively. If ξ = 1, we
have Y =
∑M−1
m=0
(
1− m
M
)Γ(M+δ)
Γ(M) Γ(1− δ)θ
δ and thus
Y ≥ 0 holds clearly. If ξ 6= 1, for ease of illustra-
tion, we rewrite Y as Y = Y1Y2, where Y1 is given by
(56), as shown at the top of the next page, and Y2 ,∑M−1
m=0
(
1− m
M
) (−1)mδ(m)
m! . We first show Y1 ≥ 0. To be spe-
cific, we further rewrite Y1 as Y1 = Γ(1− δ)θδ
1
(1−ξ)M−1
y(ξ),
where y(ξ) , Γ(1 + δ)−
∑M−2
i=0 (1− ξ)
i Γ(i+1+δ)
Γ(i+1) ξ
δ+1 and
d
dξy(ξ) = −ξ
δ(1− ξ)M−2 Γ(M+δ)Γ(M−1) . Clearly, if ξ < 1, we
have Y1 ≥ 0 due to Γ(1 − δ)θδ
1
(1−ξ)M−1
≥ 0, ddξy(ξ) ≤ 0,
y(0) = Γ(1 + δ) > 0 and y(1) = 0; if ξ > 1 and
M is odd, i.e., M = 1, 3, · · ·, we have Y1 ≥ 0 due to
Γ(1 − δ)θδ 1
(1−ξ)M−1
≥ 0, ddξy(ξ) ≥ 0, and y(1) = 0;
if ξ > 1 and M is even, i.e., M = 2, 4, · · ·, we have
Y1 ≥ 0 due to Γ(1 − δ)θδ
1
(1−ξ)M−1
≤ 0, ddξy(ξ) ≤ 0, and
y(1) = 0. Next, we show Y2 > 0. Specifically, we have
15p
,n(Tn) = 1−Ek,0Erbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0
EIn
[
Pr
[∣∣∣hTbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0wbn,k,0
∣∣∣2 ≤ θrαbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0In
]]
(a)
=1−
K∑
k,0=1
Ak,0Erbn,k,0 ,ℓ,0
EIn
[
γ(Mk,0 , θr
α
bn,k,0 ,ℓ,0
In)
Γ(Mk,0 )
]
(b)
< 1−
K∑
k=1
AkErbn,k,ℓ,0EIn
[(
1− e
−SMkθr
α
bn,k,ℓ,0
In
)Mk]
(c)
=1−
K∑
k=1
Mk∑
m=0
(
Mk
m
)
(−1)mAkErbn,k,ℓ,0
[
LIn
(
mSMkθr
α
bn,k,ℓ,0
)]
=1−
K∑
k=1
Mk∑
m=0
(
Mk
m
)
(−1)mAk
∫ ∞
0
frbn,k,ℓ,0 (r0)LIn
(
mSMkθr
α
0
)
dr0. (54)
∂pL
,n(Tn)
∂Tn,k
=
λk(φPk)
δ
(fm(Tn, θ))
2
M−1∑
m=0
(
1−
m
M
)Vm,M (ξ, θ) K∑
j=1
λj(φPj)
δ
+Wm(θ)

 . (55)
Y1 , Γ(1− δ)θ
δ 1
(1− ξ)M−1
(
Γ(1 + δ)−
M−2∑
i=0
(1− ξ)i
Γ(i + 1 + δ)
Γ(i+ 1)
ξδ+1
)
. (56)
pU,i
,n(Tn) =
∑
m∈Mi
(
M
m
)
Tn(
U˜m − V˜m
)
Tn +
∑
k∈K λk(φPk)
δ
V˜m +Wm(mSMθ)
. (57)
∂2pU,iu,n(Tn)
∂T 2n
=
−2
(∑
k∈K λk(φPk)
δ
V˜m +Wm(mSMθ)
)(
U˜m − V˜m
)
(f0(Tn,mSMθ))
2 . (58)
Y2 ≥
∑M−1
m=0
(−1)mδ(m)
m! = (−1)
M−1
(
δ−1
M−1
)
> 0. Thus, if
ξ 6= 1, we still have Y ≥ 0. By considering both cases of
ξ = 1 and ξ 6= 1, we complete the proof. 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPERTY 4
Due to the space limitations, we only prove the property
that pU
,n(Tn) = p
U,1
,n(Tn) − p
U,2
,n(Tn) + 1 is a DC function
of Tn,k. Note that the property that p
L
,n(Tn) is a concave
function of Tn,k can be proved by following similar steps.
Denote Tn ,
∑
k∈K λk(φPk)
δTn,k. By using the definition
of f0(Tn, θ) in (20), we rewrite p
U,i
,n(Tn) as (57), as shown
at the top of this page, where U˜m , U0,M (ξ,mSMθ) and
V˜m , V0,M (ξ,mSMθ). Then, we have (58), as shown at the
top of this page. By following similar proof steps for Lemma 1
in Appendix C, one can show that U˜m − V˜m ≥ 0, V˜m ≥ 0
and Wm(mSMθ) ≥ 0, and thus, we have
∂pU,i
,n
(Tn)
∂Tn
≤ 0,
implying that pU,i
,n(Tn) is concave w.r.t. Tn. Finally, since
Tn is an affine mapping of Tn,k, according to [35], we can
conclude that pU,i
,n(Tn) is also a concave function of Tn,k,
which completes the proof. 
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Denote Ien , I
e
bn,ke,0
+
∑
k∈K(I
e
n,k + I
e
−n,k) + I
e
J
,
SIRn ,
(
SIRn,ke,0
)
ke,0∈K
with SIRn,ke,0 ,
(SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0)bn,ke,0∈Φn,ke,0 and θe , 2
Re − 1. Then,
substituting (12) into (14), we have
p
e,n(Tn)
= Pr
[
max
ke,0∈K, bn,ke,0∈Φn,ke,0
log2
(
1 + SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0
)
≤ Re
]
= Pr

 ⋂
ke,0∈K, bn,ke,0∈Φn,ke,0
(
SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0 ≤ θe
)
(a)
= 1− Pr

 ⋃
ke,0∈K, bn,ke,0∈Φn,ke,0
(
SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0 > θe
)
= 1− ESIRn


1

 ⋃
ke,0∈K, bn,ke,0∈Φn,ke,0
(
SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0 > θe
)


(b)
= 1−
∑
ke,0∈K
ESIRn,ke,0

 ∑
bn,ke,0∈Φn,ke,0
1
[
SIRbn,ke,0 ,ℓe,0 > θe
]
(c)
= 1−
∑
j∈K
2πλn,jTn,j
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[∣∣∣hTbn,j ,ℓe,0wbn,j ∣∣∣2 > θerαIen
]
rdr
(d)
= 1−
∑
j∈K
2πλn,jTn,j
∫ ∞
0
LIen
(
θer
α
)
rdr, (59)
where (a) follows from the De Morgan’s laws in the gener-
alized form, and 1[X ] denotes the indicator function of the
event X , which takes value 1 when the event X happens and
value 0 when the event X does not happen; (b) is in general
an upper bound (by union bound) but holds with equality if at
most one of the BSs can provide channel capacity greater than
Re, which is precisely the case when we consider Re > 1; (c)
is obtained by using the Campbell Mecke Theorem [26]; and
(d) follows from
∣∣∣hTbn,j ,ℓe,0wbn,j
∣∣∣2 d∼ exp(1). Thus, to calculate
p
e,n(Tn, Re), we only need to calculate LIen(s). Note that, we
16
have LIen(s) = LIebn,ke,0
(s)LIe
J
(s)
∏
k∈K LIen,k(s)LIe−n,k(s).
By following the similar steps as in the derivation of LIn(s)
in Appendix A, we have LIe
bn,ke,0
(s) = (1 + ξjsr
−α)
1−Mj
,
LIe
J
(s) = LI
J
(s) and∏
k∈K
LIen,k(s)LI
e
−n,k
(s)
=


exp
(
−π
K∑
k=1
λk
(
φkPk
φjPj
)δ
Γ(Mk+δ)
Γ(Mk)
Γ(1− δ)sδ
)
, if ξk = 1,
exp
(
−π
K∑
k=1
λk
(
φkPk
φjPj
)δ
A(s)
)
, otherwise,
where A(s) is given by (39). Then, we have
LIen
(
θer
α
)
=
(
φjPj
)δ(
1 + ξjθe
)1−Mj
W0 (θe) +
∑K
k=1 λk(φkPk)
δ
V0,Mk (1, θe)
, (60)
where W0(θ) and V0,M (ξ, θ) are given by Theorem 1. Substi-
tuting (60) into (59), we complete the proof of Theorem 2. 
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